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The University of San Diego School of Law is pleased to announce the inaugural Blue
Brief, a faculty review of selected rulings from the most recent Term of the United
States Supreme Court. Even before I joined the School of Law in January of this year, I
was deeply impressed with the scholarly expertise of our outstanding faculty. I believe
you will enjoy reading their assessments and reviews of cases ranging across a variety
of significant topics, including antitrust, church and state, copyright, criminal law,
elections, healthcare, and student speech.
Some cases represent the Court’s grappling with the constitutional doctrines that you
studied in law school, including free speech and personal jurisdiction. Others feature
return engagements for important federal statutes, such as the Voting Rights Act, and
the Affordable Care Act. In some ways, this past term of the Court was unique. Like
the rest of the world, the Court had to embrace a wide range of innovative ways to
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operate during the pandemic. The biggest technological change was the shift to
livestream audio technology. This Term also witnessed the influence of the Court’s
newest member, Justice Amy Coney Barrett.

We are very happy to share the insights of our eminent faculty. We are eagerly awaiting
the opening of the Court’s new Term on October 4, and we look forward to reporting
back to you next summer with the latest developments.

Warm Regards,

Robert A. Schapiro
Dean and C. Hugh Friedman Professor of Law
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May a high school discipline a student for what she expresses while not in school? In
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the U.S. Supreme Court gave its answer to this
question: a resounding “maybe.”

At the end of her freshman year at Mahanoy Area High School, Brandi Levy tried out
for the varsity cheerleading team. She did not make it but was offered a spot on the
junior varsity cheerleading team. Angered by not making the varsity team, particularly
because an incoming freshman did, Brandi, while not at school, took to Snapchat and
posted a picture of her raised middle finger and an F-bomb-filled denunciation of various
school activities, including cheerleading. Although that post was up only 24 hours,
during this time, one of the students in Brandi’s Snapchat audience took a screenshot of
Brandi’s post and showed it to the student’s mother, a cheerleading coach. That
ultimately lead to a decision by the coaches, the school administrators, and the school
5

board to suspend Brandi from the junior varsity cheerleading team for one year. The
basis for that decision was that Brandi had violated team and school rules regarding foul
language and sportsmanship.

Through her parents, Brandi sued the school district in federal court. The district court,
affirmed on appeal by the circuit court, ordered that Brandi be reinstated on the junior
varsity team. The district court judge argued that the post did not cause any substantial
disruption of school activities and therefore was a constitutionally protected
expression. This was the standard the Supreme Court had announced for on-campus
expression in 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, in
which students wore black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam War. The court of
appeals, however, in upholding the district court's decision, went beyond that court's
holding and held that Tinker only applied to expression on campus and that schools
could not discipline students for expression off-campus.
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, upheld the lower courts’ rulings in Brandi's
favor. But it refused to go as far as the circuit court and deny schools’ ability to
discipline students for off-campus expression. The Court gave some examples of offcampus expression that schools might be able to regulate: cases of serious bullying or
harassing other students; threats aimed at teachers or students; failure to follow rules
about lessons, writing papers, the use of computers, and online school activities; and
breaches of school security devices. The Court refused to opine on these possible
exceptions to the circuit court’s blanket restriction on schools’ regulating off-campus
speech. It said, “We are uncertain as to the length or content of any such list of
appropriate exceptions or carveouts to the [circuit court’s] rule…. Neither do we know
how such a list might vary, depending upon a student's age, the nature of the school's
off-campus activity, or the impact upon the school itself. Thus, we do not now set forth
a broad, highly general First Amendment rule….” The Court did, however, note that
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schools do not stand in the place of parents with respect to off-campus speech, that
students must have some room to speak free from school regulation, and that schools
themselves have an interest in protecting unpopular expression.
When the Court turned to consider Brandi’s speech, it upheld her right not to be
sanctioned on essentially the same basis as had the district court—namely, that the
speech posed little danger of substantially disrupting either classes or cheerleading.
Eight of the Court’s nine justices joined the Court’s opinion and its holding in favor of
Brandi’s reinstatement. Justice Thomas, however, dissented. He believed that Brandi’s
post degraded the cheerleading program and staff in front of other students and thus had
a tendency to subvert the cheerleading coach's authority. For that, Thomas argued,
Brandi's discipline was appropriate.
Although the Court’s decision settled Brandi’s case, it settled almost nothing
else. Unless a school attempts to discipline a student in circumstances almost identical
to Brandi’s, it is anyone’s guess how such a case will be decided.
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In 2016, Arizona changed its state election law to narrow the range of people who can
collect and submit votes on behalf of Arizona voters. The Democratic National
Committee (DNC) sued state officials, alleging that the state was violating Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) both through the new restriction on ballot
collecting and through a longer-standing regulation that invalidates election-day votes
cast outside voters’ designated precincts. In Brnovich v. DNC, the Supreme Court
upheld the Arizona laws by vote of 6-3.
Section 2 of the VRA (as amended) prohibits any state voting regulation that “results in
a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color….” The section elaborates that it is violated if, based on “the totality of
circumstances,” the political process is not “equally open to participation” by racial
minorities in that they “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
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participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” The
DNC alleged that both state regulations “adversely and disparately affect Arizona’s
American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens,” and that the ballotcollection restriction was also “enacted with discriminatory intent.” The district court
rejected these allegations, finding that the plaintiffs had not proven disparate impacts
large enough to deprive racial minorities of equal access to the political process. The
district court also rejected the allegation of discriminatory intent, while acknowledging
that “some individual legislators and proponents were motivated in part by partisan
interests.” A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, but the judgment was reversed en banc.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Kagan’s dissent noted that Arizona had tried to restrict
ballot collection in 2011, but retreated during preclearance review by the United States
Department of Justice under Section 5 of the VRA. After the Supreme Court in Shelby
County v. Holder freed the state from the constraints of Section 5, Arizona tried again.
The Court in Shelby County had emphasized that Section 2’s constraint on state voting
restrictions remained in full force. But what was the shape of that constraint? Absent
proof of intentional race discrimination, did Section 2 nonetheless provide a remedy for
racial disparate impacts any time a state could not show that its rules were strictly
necessary to serve strong state interests?
Justice Alito’s majority opinion said no. Disparate impacts are relevant to whether state
voting rules comply with Section 2, the Court reasoned, but so are many other factors,
including how burdensome the rules are, how much they depart from the status quo
when Section 2’s current language was enacted, how large the racial disparities in the
rules’ impact are, what other opportunities for voting are available, and the strength of
state interests served by the challenged rules. “[I]n determining ‘based on the totality of
circumstances’ whether a rule goes too far, it is important to consider the reason for the
rule,” Justice Alito wrote. “Rules that are supported by strong state interests are less
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likely to violate § 2.” Rules that have a racial disparate impact but serve strong state
interests might be valid even if the state could have chosen other rules with less disparate
impact to protect those interests. Under the majority’s multi-factor analysis, Arizona’s
rules did not violate the VRA.
What were the strong state interests that Arizona’s restrictions reasonably served? For
the ballot-collecting rule, the majority identified preventing fraud, intimidation, and
undue influence. The dissenters judged these interests sufficiently served by others
means, notably the criminal law. In emphasizing the countervailing interest supporting
ballot collection, they cited evidence that “[o]nly 18% of Native voters in rural counties
receive home mail delivery, compared to 86% of white voters living in those counties,”
and that “Native Americans in rural Arizona ‘often must travel 45 minutes to 2 hours
just to get to a mailbox.’”

What strong interests were served by the rule against voting out of precinct? The
interests cited by the majority were about serving the interests of the voters: distributing
voters evenly in districts to reduce wait times, providing polling places closer to home,
and supplying voters with ballots that list only the candidates and questions on which
they can vote. The Ninth Circuit had concluded these were not sufficient reasons for
discarding out-of-precinct votes. It’s one thing to have a rule, but it’s quite another to
attach a consequence to violating the rule that is at odds with the interests of the rule’s
intended beneficiaries. Justice Alito observed that counting out-of-precinct votes would
complicate vote counting and encourage voters who don’t care about voting for local
officeholders and issues, to vote wherever they pleased. But do those concerns really
reflect strong state interests? If voters are content to deprive themselves of opportunity
to vote for local officeholders and issues, how is that a reason to void their choices for
statewide and national offices and issues? This seems especially bothersome when there
is appreciable risk that a state’s cited reasons for a rule are pretextual. Requiring votes
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to be cast in precinct might be a way to force voters to face long lines in under-resourced
neighborhoods rather than drive to other places where wait times are shorter. That might
deter them from voting. And though not currently true in Arizona, one could imagine
prohibitions of out-of-precinct voting complementing restrictions on mail-in voting to
buttress partisan gerrymandering. To the extent voters mail in their secret ballots, or
vote out of precinct, partisan mapmakers may be deprived of data they need to rig
boundaries with precision. Precinct voting helps take the guesswork out of
gerrymandering.

The challenge posed by Brnovich for those who seek to challenge the current wave of
state legislative changes to voting rules and procedures derives from the fact that the
concerns of the litigants are imperfectly aligned with the concerns of the VRA. The act
focuses on race discrimination. The litigants are primarily focused on partisan
discrimination. Race discrimination may loom large behind some instances of partisan
discrimination, but not all. Consider, for example, the state voting rule struck down by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire the day after Brnovich was decided. That rule
made it hard for college students to establish domicile in New Hampshire for the
purpose of voting there. The state court in that case could point to a state constitutional
promise of voting rights without needing to establish a racial dimension to the state
law’s injustice. Brnovich makes it less likely that suing over racial disparate impacts
will help protect democracy for all of us.
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In Edwards v. Vannoy, the Court held that Ramos v. Louisiana did not apply
retroactively to convictions no longer subject to direct review when the Court decided
Ramos. Apodaca v. Oregon held that the federal constitution permits felony convictions
in state courts by nonunanimous jury verdicts of ten to two. Ramos overruled Apodaca
based on the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment.

A Louisiana jury convicted the petitioner, Edwards, of robbery, rape, and kidnapping by
a vote of eleven to one, a dozen years before Ramos. Edwards sought to vacate his
conviction by a petition for federal habeas corpus.

The plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane sets out the template for assessing retroactivity
issues raised when state prisoners seek the benefit of Supreme Court decisions rendered
after their convictions have become final. Teague decreed a distinction between
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procedural and substantive constitutional rules. Procedural rules apply retroactively to
all defendants who still have the right to seek a writ of certiorari from SCOTUS. These
defendants stand in the same time zone as the named defendant in the new decision
itself. When the defendant’s conviction has been affirmed by the state’s highest
appellate court, however, and his or her petition for certiorari is either filed and denied or
not filed and time-barred, the case is different. Here the state courts have committed no
error and retrials figure to be both difficult and costly. The stakes are higher because the
prisoners serving the longest sentences, most likely to benefit from full retroactivity,
generally have been convicted of the most serious crimes.
Teague also recognized an exception for “watershed” procedural rulings exemplified by
Gideon v. Wainwright. In the years since Teague, however, it became increasingly
apparent that the “watershed rulings” category was a class of one—to wit, Gideon itself.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified the process for state
prisoners seeking federal habeas relief. That portion of the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.
§2254(d), purports to preclude federal habeas relief if the prisoner’s claim was
adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court decision was “contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]”

Under Teague, new constitutional rules of substantive criminal law have full retroactive
effect. SCOTUS decisions have full retroactive effect if they reverse state convictions
because the definition of the forbidden conduct or the severity of the sentence violates
the federal Constitution. For example, the Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions
limiting juvenile sentences to death or life-without-parole apply even to offenders whose
cases have been final for years.
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Under Teague, Edwards was relatively straightforward for a Supreme Court case!
Ramos declared a new procedural rule, and unless it qualified as “watershed” the new
procedural rule would not apply to Edwards. But each of the opinions in Edwards went
beyond a straightforward application of Teague.

The majority opinion, per Justice Kavanaugh, joined by the Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Barrett, reviewed the
precedents under Teague and came to the predictable result. The majority, however,
went further and openly announced the death of the “watershed” category. Henceforth, a
new procedural ruling applies to all cases still pending on direct review to the Supreme
Court—and to no others. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor
in dissent, would have breathed new life into the “watershed” category by overturning
Edwards’s conviction. Given the six-to-three result, the Kagan opinion looks like
watershed-under-the-bridge.

Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed interlocking concurrences, each joining the
other’s separate opinion. Justice Thomas castigated the majority for approaching the
issue through the lens of Teague rather than from the perspective of the post-Teague
AEDPA. Justice Gorsuch hearkened back to the common-law roots of the Great Writ,
which, prior to Brown v. Allen, was understood as a writ to try or release a prisoner
rather than as a vehicle for appellate review. Before Allen, habeas would not lie to
vacate a conviction because of errors at trial. Unless the conviction or sentence
exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction, a conviction was a good return to the writ.

Before Allen, this jurisdictional error category was not rigidly defined. Allen itself
equated any violation of the federal constitution with jurisdictional error. That was at a
time before Mapp, Gideon, and Miranda. Teague was one of several post-Allen
decisions recognizing constitutional claims that were not cognizable on federal habeas,
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without questioning Allen’s starting point—for example, that federal constitutional
claims are cognizable on habeas, subject to various specific, pragmatically-justified
exceptions.

So what was left unsaid in Edwards is more interesting than what was said. Arguably,
Teague’s substantive-law category mirrors the older concept of jurisdictional errors.
What if those concepts diverge? Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch seem to believe
that, in case of a conflict, the statute prevails over Teague. The majority ignored both
the statute and the concurring opinions, an omission especially curious given the
majority’s detailed rejoinder to the dissent.

Going forward, convictions can be returned only by unanimous juries. On the longstanding and difficult issues raised by federal habeas for state prisoners, the jury is still
out.
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On the final day of this year’s Supreme Court term, the Court struck down a California
requirement that charitable organizations must disclose the identities of their major
donors to the state Attorney General’s office. The disclosure requirement—dormant for
many years—was revived by Kamala Harris when she was Attorney General of
California. With a 6-to-3 vote along ideological lines, the Court in Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta held the California disclosure regime to be
unconstitutional on its face because it would chill First Amendment freedoms of
association and speech and could not be justified as narrowly tailored to an important
government interest.

The case arose from a challenge to the disclosure policy by two conservative charitable
organizations. The district court held in their favor, finding that the groups and their
supporters had already received violent threats and harassment in the past and that
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donors would be less likely to contribute if they might be identified and made the targets
of reprisals. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and ruled for the state, holding
that the policy enhanced the efficiency of enforcing the charity laws. The Supreme
Court’s decision reverses the Ninth Circuit, noting that although California promises to
keep confidential the identities of donors, thousands of disclosures had been
inadvertently posted on the Attorney General’s website even during the course of the
litigation. Donors might also reasonably be concerned that they could be “doxxed” by
deliberate leaks.

The Court cited a vivid precedent for its decision: the 1958 civil-rights-era case NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. The NAACP had opened an office in Alabama to support
racial integration, and in response, NAACP members were threatened with economic
reprisals and violence. As part of an effort to oust the NAACP from the state, the
Alabama Attorney General demanded the group’s membership lists. The Supreme Court
held that effective advocacy is “undeniably enhanced by group association,” and that the
Alabama Attorney General’s demand violated freedom of association and free speech
rights under the First Amendment.

Although the parties to the present case were conservative organizations, they were
joined by hundreds of other groups across the political spectrum, including the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which filed
amicus briefs on behalf of the challengers and against compulsory disclosure of donors.
Nonetheless, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, dissented from
the Court’s decision. The dissenters would have accepted California’s promise of
confidentiality and the state’s claim that identifying donors would be conducive to law
enforcement.
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The six justices in the majority were themselves divided on a somewhat technical
question. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, said that
when government seeks to compel disclosure of advocacy groups’ members or donors,
the Court should review the need for disclosure with “exacting scrutiny.” Justices Alito
and Gorsuch on the other hand implied, and Justice Thomas explicitly said, that the
standard should be “strict scrutiny.” This might seem a recondite—if not almost
medieval—verbal difference: angels, pin. But given the way the courts use these
standards, “strict scrutiny” is stricter than “exacting scrutiny.” The implication is that
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett might be more willing to
uphold a disclosure requirement if there were a better justification for it in another case,
whereas Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas might require a truly “compelling” state
interest before they would uphold such a thing.

But the majority were united on the essential point in this case. As Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, the California disclosure requirement “‘creates an unnecessary risk of chilling’ in
violation of the First Amendment, indiscriminately sweeping up the information of every
major donor with reason to remain anonymous. The petitioners here, for example,
introduced evidence that they and their supporters have been subjected to bomb threats,
protests, stalking, and physical violence. Such risks are heightened in the 21st century
and seem to grow with each passing year, since ‘anyone with access to a computer [can]
compile a wealth of information about anyone,’ including such sensitive details as a
person’s home address or the school attended by his children.”

There is a long tradition of anonymity in American political debate, running back to the
Federalist Papers and Tom Paine’s Common Sense; both originally published
anonymously or under pseudonyms. The Supreme Court’s decision protects the ability
of groups with unpopular causes—especially if unpopular with the government—to raise
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funds and to make their points in public debate, without exposing their members, donors,
or supporters to have their lives or livelihoods cancelled.
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Seeking a larger share of the gargantuan revenues generated by college football and
basketball, college athletes sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),
alleging that the association and a number of its conferences violated antitrust laws by
agreeing to restrict the compensation that member institutions may offer their players.
The district judge held that the NCAA’s restrictions on “education-related”
compensation ran afoul of the law and enjoined enforcement of these “unreasonable
restraints.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and in National Collegiate Athletic Association
v. Alston, a unanimous Supreme Court did likewise.

Whether the restrictions on compensation violated antitrust law depended on whether
they were likely to have anticompetitive consequences, such as inefficient production or
allocation of resources. The college athletes claimed that the restrictions did just that by
causing the compensation that the athletes received to fall below the level that would
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prevail in a competitive market. To evaluate this claim, standard antitrust analysis
required the court to assess the NCAA’s power to set below-market compensation.
Assessment of this “market power,” in turn, required the court to define the “relevant
market.” On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court defined it as the
market for the student-athletes’ athletic services. After summary judgment was entered,
the NCAA challenged this definition, but the challenge was untimely and inadequately
supported. The NCAA did not pursue the challenge on appeal.

The definition of the relevant market played an outsized role in the outcome of this case,
as it has in many, probably most antitrust cases, including the NCAA’s previous losing
trip to the Supreme Court, NCAA v. Board of Regents. In a market defined as studentathletes’ athletic services, the NCAA was practically the only buyer, a “monopsonist” in
antitrust speak. Accordingly, the Court found that the NCAA had the power to set
below-market compensation, which made it almost inevitable that the court would
conclude that the restrictions on compensation caused the compensation to fall below the
competitive level.

That the compensation restrictions had this anticompetitive consequence did not
necessarily mean that they ran afoul of the antitrust laws. Under the “rule of reason,” the
Court was obliged to weigh this anticompetitive consequence against any procompetitive
consequences that the NCAA showed the restrictions had. At the Supreme Court, the
NCAA argued that the principal procompetitive consequence of its compensation
restrictions was that they “preserve[d] amateurism, which in turn widen[ed] consumer
choice by providing a unique product—amateur college sports as distinct from
professional sports.”

This argument failed to carry the day, and it is this failure that has potentially powerful
implications for college sports. The argument failed for two interrelated reasons. First,
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the NCAA did not offer a coherent definition of “amateurism” that comported with its
own frequently changing rules about what compensation was permitted—some of it noneducation-related—and what was prohibited. Second, the NCAA offered no persuasive
evidence either (a) that, in formulating its restrictions on compensation, it considered
their impact on consumer demand or (b) that its widening of the scope of permissible
compensation since 2015 had any negative impact on consumer demand.
Accordingly, the district court enjoined the enforcement of the NCAA’s restrictions on
“education-related” compensation. This opened the door for colleges and universities to
offer the athletes on their teams “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and
other items. . . related to the pursuit of various academic studies. . . post-eligibility
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school; scholarships
to attend vocational school; expenses for pre- and post-eligibility tutoring;
[reimbursement for] expenses incurred in connection with studying abroad. . . ; and paid
post-eligibility internships.” Of course, this sort of compensation would be small beer
compared to “non-education-related” compensation, such as salaries and signing
bonuses.
For the most part, the district court declined to enjoin the NCAA’s restrictions on “noneducation-related compensation,” and the college athletes did not ask the Justices to
review this decision. Had they, would they have prevailed? They would have picked up
Justice Kavanaugh’s vote, as he went out of his way to make clear in his concurring
opinion. Using Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court as a guide, one would predict
that the athletes’ ability to secure the votes of the other justices would have depended
largely on the NCAA’s evidence that its restrictions on non-education-related
compensation had a positive impact on consumer demand. The NCAA did not have
much. The district court cited only the testimony of “[s]ome lay witnesses, particularly
those who have professional experience with third-party networks such as CBS or
22

ESPN, . . . that the value of media rights contracts has a relationship to the popularity of
college sports as being distinguishable from professional sports.” Such evidence may
not stand up against contrary empirical evidence marshalled by college athletes in a
future case challenging the NCAA’s restrictions on non-education-related compensation.
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In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, the Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that the state in which an auto accident occurred could
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer for alleged defects in
a vehicle that injured a resident of that state. However, the justices offered strikingly
divergent views as to why jurisdiction exists in such cases.

The opinion involved two consolidated cases. In the first, a suit was filed in Montana by
the estate of a Montana resident killed when the tread allegedly separated from the tire of
her 1996 Ford Explorer as she drove the vehicle near her home. In the second, the
airbag of a 1994 Crown Victoria allegedly failed to deploy during an accident that
occurred in Minnesota, injuring a Minnesota resident who subsequently sued Ford Motor
Company in that state.
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Both actions were filed by in-state residents based upon an accident that transpired in the
state. However, in both cases, the vehicles were originally purchased outside the state.
The defendant argued that because the defective vehicle was sold elsewhere, the
requirements of specific personal jurisdiction were not satisfied because the lawsuit did
not arise out of activity that occurred in the forum. The lower courts disagreed, holding
that specific jurisdiction existed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The narrowest view of personal jurisdiction in such cases was articulated by Justice
Alito, who maintained that while personal jurisdiction existed, that was only because the
lawsuit “arose out of”—i.e., was directly caused by—Ford’s contacts with the forum
state. Ford indisputably advertised in the forum state, sold vehicles of the same make
and model in the forum state, and serviced those same types of vehicles in the forum
state. Such contacts, Justice Alito argued, likely encouraged the purchase and use of the
defective vehicles at issue, thereby creating specific jurisdiction.

By contrast, the majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, did not believe that a strict
causal relationship necessarily existed here, nor that such a causal connection was
required by either precedent or common sense. Justice Kagan cited prior opinions that
held that personal jurisdiction existed if a cause of action either “arose out of” or
“related” to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Because Ford’s advertising,
sales, and service in the forum state “related to” the vehicles involved in the accident, the
majority held that specific jurisdiction existed notwithstanding the potential absence of a
“but for” causal relationship between those in-state events and the out-of-state purchase
of the vehicles.
A final vision of personal jurisdiction was articulated by Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence,
joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Gorsuch maintained that the doctrine of specific
jurisdiction articulated in International Shoe v. State of Washington was outdated, and he
25

argued for an alternative “originalist” view of jurisdiction. As the majority opinion
noted, Justice Gorsuch did not elaborate on the precise contours of such an alternative
approach; however, Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning seemed to suggest that because, in his
view, states could constitutionally bar out-of-state manufacturers from entering their
state entirely (notwithstanding modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence), states
could similarly condition doing business in the state upon consent to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction there.
Justice Gorsuch’s view, if adopted, would likely result in an expansion of the
constitutionally permissible exercise of personal jurisdiction by state courts. Justice
Alito’s concurrence expressed some support for this alternative vision, and Justice
Barrett did not participate in the case. The opinion in Ford Motor Company accordingly
suggests that there is substantial support amongst some of the conservative members of
the Court for a departure from the minimum contacts test applied for the past 75 years
since International Shoe, although at present, not by a majority of the justices.
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Google, LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., brought closure
to a protracted copyright case and strengthened fair use arguments in cases where
copying facilitates production of complementary, rather than substitute, technology.

The copyrighted works at issue were part of the Java technologies developed by Sun
Microsystems. Sun sought to make Java a “cross-platform” technology that would allow
developers to write programs that would run on different operating systems. It therefore
promoted widespread use of Java, and millions of programmers learned to use it.

When Google began to develop the Android operating system for mobile phones, it
sought to take advantage of industry familiarity with Java by incorporating certain Java
technology into the Android platform. Google negotiated with Sun for a license, but the
negotiations failed. Google went ahead on its own, with over 100 engineers working for
27

three years to develop Android. Google copied approximately 11,500 lines of Java code
relating to APIs—interfaces between the operating system and application programs.

Oracle bought Sun in 2009. The following year, Oracle sued Google for copyright
infringement. The parties called the specific code at issue “declaring code,” which
meant code that provides both the name for specific tasks and the location of each task
within the API’s organizational system. The case was tried twice. Oracle won neither
trial but won two appeals: the first holding that the relevant code was copyrightable and
the second that Google’s copying was not fair use. The Supreme Court assumed the first
issue was correctly decided and reversed on the second.

The Copyright Act lists four nonexclusive fair use factors: (1) the purpose and character
of the use (copying), including whether it is commercial; (2) the nature of the copied
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the copied portion in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the copying upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. Factors one and four often reduce to asking if the
copying substituted for purchase or license of the copied work, and they tend to point the
same way. In most cases, they are the most important factors.

Justice Breyer wrote for the majority. He was the justice most familiar with the issues,
having written in 1970 an article assessing whether software should be treated as
copyrightable subject matter (he was skeptical), a question resolved by later amendment
to the Copyright Act. His opinion began with the nature of the work (factor two). The
majority thought the declaring code inseparably tied to uncopyrightable ideas and
implementing code, in which Oracle did not hold the rights. Unlike many programs, the
majority thought the value of declaring code “in significant part derives from the value
that those who do not hold copyrights, namely, computer programmers, invest of their
own time and effort to learn the API’s system.”
28

The Court’s analysis of the nature of the code was reflected in its analysis of the first
factor—the nature of the copying. Case law distinguishes “transformative” uses from
others, with “transformative” referring to copying to create something new rather than
just to reproduce the copyrighted work. The majority found that Google’s copying was
transformative because it facilitated the creation and use of new works—programs
written by programmers using Java declaring code. In economic terms, the majority saw
the copied declaring code as facilitating creation of complements rather than substitutes
for the declaring code itself. This analysis was sound, particularly given that much of
the value of the declaring code appeared to derive from developer familiarity rather than
from an intrinsic property of the code.

With respect to the amount of copying (factor three), the majority noted that one can
either consider a nominal amount—the 11,500 lines of code Google copied—or a
fraction. If it is a fraction, a denominator must be chosen. The majority chose the latter
approach because the purpose of the copied declaring code was to invoke execution of
other code, which means the utility of the copied code was inextricably tied to a greater
whole. Google did not copy the declaring code for its standalone value—as one might
copy just the best parts of a story, or the juiciest revelation in a book (“why I pardoned
Nixon” was the part of Gerald Ford’s biography most people cared about). Instead,
Google’s copying allowed developers to take advantage of their own knowledge of Java
to work with the APIs as a whole. Java APIs had 2.86 million lines of code, of which
the copied code comprised 0.4 percent, which the majority found weighed in favor of
fair use, particularly given that the copied code was tied to transformative uses.
The majority’s analysis of the fourth factor—market effects—considered the cost to the
rightsholder (Oracle), the nature of that cost (whether by substitution or reduction of
demand as might result from a negative review), and the public benefit. The majority
cautioned that it did not hold that each of these elements must always be considered in
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every case, but its full-blown cost-benefit approach has no logical bound and future
litigants would do well to cover each element. The history of the technology hurt Oracle
on this point. Sun was not a smartphone company, and its former CEO testified that
Google’s copying did not cause Sun to fail in the smartphone market. In addition, Sun’s
plans for Java depended in part on popularizing the technology so developers might
embrace it, a purpose that suggested that copying furthered rather than hindered Sun’s
business model. And the majority noted that pointing to the revenue Google earned
from Android, was not by itself, enough to answer the question whether revenue was
generated by declaring code rather than by developer investments in learning.

In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the majority gave insufficient weight to
Congress’s decision to extend copyright protection to software. He thought this decision
effectively foreclosed the distinction between declaring code and implementing code,
which the majority stressed. The majority opinion took a functional approach; the
dissent was comparatively formal and categorical.
On balance, the majority’s analysis is sound and strikes a good balance between the
creator’s interest in earning a return and the public interest in access to works. The
formal approach adopted by the dissent is at odds with the run of copyright cases, and it
is heartening that the approach received little support.
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Since its enactment in 2010, the Affordable Care Act has provoked Tasmanian-devil-like
fury among conservatives, resulting in at least three major Supreme Court challenges.
This term’s California v. Texas is the latest episode. The ACA has dodged these attacks
so far—and, as with Bugs Bunny, sometimes improbably.
Justice Alito’s dissent in California v. Texas summarized the history of the ACA’s
improbable survival.
No one can fail to be impressed by the lengths to which this Court has been
willing to go to defend the ACA against all threats. A penalty is a tax.
Here, Justice Alito referred to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in 2012’s NFIB v.
Sebelius, which upheld the “individual mandate” against the attack that Congress lacked
authority to impose a monetary penalty on people who did not buy minimum, essential
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health insurance. Five justices, including Roberts, did agree that Congress lacked
commerce clause power to do so, reasoning that the ACA did not regulate a market but
forced people to enter one. But Roberts provided the fifth vote to uphold the mandate
under the taxing power, even though construing a “penalty” to be a tax was not the most
“natural reading” of the ACA.
The United States is a State.
Here, Justice Alito referred to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in 2015’s King v. Burwell.
The ACA authorized states and the federal government to create insurance “exchanges”
to make it easier for individuals to buy individual policies and gave them tax credits for
buying policies through “an Exchange established by the State.” But what about
insurance purchased through the federal exchange? As he had in NFIB, Roberts rejected
the challenge and brushed aside the most “natural reading” of the ACA in favor of a
“fairly possible” one that preserved the tax credits.
And 18 States who bear costly burdens under the ACA cannot even get a foot in
the door to raise a constitutional challenge. So a tax that does not tax is allowed
to stand and support one of the biggest Government programs in our Nation's
history.
That’s this term’s California v. Texas. State and individual plaintiffs had argued that the
individual mandate was no longer a constitutional exercise of the taxing power because
in 2017 Congress had set the penalty/tax to zero. Because the “individual mandate” was
central to the ACA’s scheme, they argued, it could not be severed from the rest of the
ACA, and the ACA must fall as a whole.
Once again, the ACA survived. This time, the ACA owed its survival to the Court’s
holding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The individuals’ claims were easy
to dismiss. People faced no penalty if they didn’t buy insurance, so there was no injury
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in fact. To the extent the states argued that their “injury” derived from costs flowing
from individuals’ insurance purchases, the states too lacked standing.

Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the states had standing on a different theory—the
theory of “inseverability.” Other constitutional provisions of the ACA (the expansion of
Medicaid, for example) undoubtably imposed costs on the states, and thus, injured them.
Justice Alito contended that the Court could redress these injuries by invalidating the
ACA as a whole, which should follow if the individual mandate was both
unconstitutional (not a tax and not justified under the taxing power) and not severable.

The Court refused to address this theory as being raised too late. But if it had, it likely
would have rejected it. Chief Justice Roberts had scoffed in oral argument that it “really
expands standing dramatically.” “[S]omebody not injured [by] the provision that needs
challenging. . . [could] roam around through” a major piece of legislation like the ACA
and “pick out whichever” provisions “he wants to. . . attack.” Standing must be more
constrained because “the only reason we have the authority to interpret the Constitution
is because we have the responsibility of deciding actual cases.”

The states would have lost on the merits anyway. True, in 2010, Congress had believed
the individual mandate was essential to the ACA. But in 2017, when Congress zeroed
the penalty out, Congress no longer thought so, and Congressional intent governs
severability. Congress also happened to be right: healthy people buy insurance without a
mandate. The mandate is only part of the ACA—among other things. The ACA also
dramatically expands Medicaid, subsidizes the purchase of insurance, bars insurance
companies from excluding preexisting conditions, requires them to assess risk at the
community, not individual, level, and requires many employers to provide their
employees with insurance.
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More challenges to the ACA loom on the horizon. One, Kelley v. Becerra, concerns
federal regulations that require insurance companies to cover certain preventative care at
low or no cost. These regulations, the plaintiffs claim, are unconstitutional because the
regulatory bodies that create the list of mandated preventative care are not Article II
“officers of the United States”. Congress’s delegation of authority to these bodies is also
challenged as unconstitutionally vague. According to a couple of legal scholars, this
second ground might get traction with at least five justices on a theory of delegation
favored by Justice Gorsuch and recently endorsed by four other justices. So, stay tuned!
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In Collins v. Yellen, the Supreme Court made clear that the limitation on Congress’s
ability to restrict the President’s removal power over executive officials announced in
last year’s Seila Law case was no aberration. Instead, the Court extended that holding to
place additional limits on Congress’s ability to create independent agencies and to
prevent presidents from removing executive officers. The case also involved interesting
disputes over the appropriate remedy for unconstitutional removal restrictions.

Collins involved the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency
with regulatory and conservatorship authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After
the agency was created following the 2008 financial crisis, it placed Fannie and Freddie
into conservatorship and negotiated agreements for the companies.
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Relying on last year’s decision in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Fannie and Freddie shareholders challenged one of the agreements on the ground that the
office of the director of FHFA was unconstitutional because the director could only be
removed for cause by the president. In Seila Law, the Supreme Court had significantly
cut back on the 1935 case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which had allowed
Congress to place a for-cause removal restriction on the heads of independent agencies.
While Humphrey’s Executor involved a politically bipartisan commission, which
exercised mainly quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority, Seila Law involved the
CFPB, an agency that was controlled by a single director and had broad executive
authority over financial regulation. The Court concluded that Humphrey’s Executor’s
allowance of for-cause removal restrictions could not be extended to the CFPB because
it was not a politically bipartisan commission but a single-headed agency, and because it
exercised much broader executive authority than the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
did in Humphrey’s Executor.

In Collins, the Court agreed with the shareholders that the removal restriction on the
director of FHFA was unconstitutional because—unlike the FTC in Humphrey’s
Executor—the agency was not a political bipartisan commission, but an agency headed
by a single official. While defenders of FHFA’s removal restriction argued it was
distinguishable from the CFPB, in part, because the agency had less executive power in
a variety of ways, the Court disagreed. Instead, the Court made clear that removal
restrictions on single-headed agencies were unconstitutional even when an agency
exercised less than “significant executive authority.” This extension of the Seila Law
precedent suggests that it will be given a broad interpretation, and even raises the
possibility that the Court will in the future hold unconstitutional presidential removal
restrictions on some or all politically bipartisan commissions.
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The three progressive justices parted ways from the majority in Collins. Justice Kagan
accepted Seila Law as a matter of stare decisis, even though she had strongly disagreed
with the decision. But while she agreed that Seila Law dictated the outcome in Collins,
she refused to join the majority on the ground that its opinion unnecessarily extended the
Seila Law holding. By contrast, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, did not
believe that Seila Law governed Collins, but instead was distinguishable in part because
the FHFA wielded less than significant executive power.

Finally, the justices differed as to the remedy. The majority concluded that the mere fact
that the director of FHFA was subject to a statutory removal restriction did not
necessarily render his actions unconstitutional. Instead, his actions would only be
unconstitutional if there was evidence that the president would have desired that he take
different actions. By contrast, Justice Gorsuch argued that the removal restriction
automatically rendered the director’s actions unconstitutional. Whatever the merits of
this legal debate amongst the justices accomplished, the decision has already had a realworld consequence. In the days after the decision, President Biden promptly removed
FHFA’s director and the head of the Social Security Administration. In the political
sphere, at least, the Collins decision is already making its impact felt.
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Headlines—and vote counts—can be misleading. In the much-anticipated case of
Fulton v. Philadelphia, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Philadelphia had
violated the free exercise rights of Catholic Social Services (CSS) by excluding the
church agency from the city’s foster care program for refusing to sign onto the city’s
anti-discrimination policy. The conflict between religious freedom and
antidiscrimination laws has been fiercely debated—and fiercely litigated—in recent
years; and the result in Fulton might seem to indicate a resounding victory for the
religious freedom side. But your suspicions might be aroused upon learning that the
Court’s more liberal justices (Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer) all joined in the majority
opinion by the Chief Justice, while the more reliably conservative justices (Alito,
Gorsuch, and Thomas) wrote or joined concurring opinions sharply attacking the
majority. And the suspicions would be warranted.
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Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services contracts with over twenty private
agencies, some religious and some secular, to assess applications and make placements
in its foster care program. CSS has been one of those agencies for decades, and it is
currently the only agency that declines (on religious grounds) to place children with
unmarried or same-sex couples. In fact, no same-sex couple has ever applied to CSS. If
that were to happen, the agency would refer the couple to one of the other agencies.
Nonetheless, when a newspaper criticized the arrangement, the city ceased to refer
applications to CSS, and it thereafter declined to renew CSS’s contract.
CSS contended that the city’s actions violated the First Amendment’s free exercise
clause. All nine justices agreed. So much for the case itself!

But Fulton had been apprehensively watched because of its larger implications. Here is
some boiled-down background. In modern debates, two major interpretations of the free
exercise clause have dominated discussion. What might be called the “accommodation”
interpretation holds that government should affirmatively make space for the exercise of
religion. If a law burdens a believer’s exercise of religion, the believer should be
excused unless the government has an overriding interest in compliance. Such excusals
are called “free exercise exemptions.” The alternative “neutrality” interpretation takes a
different view: the free exercise clause does not require exemptions for religious
objectors, but merely serves to prevent government from discriminating against religion,
or against a particular religion.

From at least 1963 through 1990, the Court embraced the accommodation interpretation,
with Justice William Brennan as the doctrine’s leading champion. But in 1990, in
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court changed course and embraced the neutrality
interpretation (with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissenting). So long as a
law is religiously neutral and generally applicable, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the
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Court, the fact that it burdens someone’s exercise of religion does not create a
constitutional problem.

The Smith decision was heavily criticized at the time, by scholars, by Congress, and in
effect by President Bill Clinton (who enthusiastically supported and signed a law—the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act—that attempted to undo the decision on a statutory
level). Since then, however, much in the political and academic landscapes has changed.
Now, it is more often the conservatives who favor and the liberals who oppose strong
protection for religious freedom. When Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in 1993, virtually everyone in and out of Congress applauded. When
Indiana enacted a virtually identical law in 2015, all hell broke loose.

Fulton looked to be a fraught case, because in accepting review, the justices had
indicated that they would consider overruling Smith. In the end, though, they didn’t.

To be sure, the three more conservative justices argued vigorously that the Court should
have overruled Smith, and at least two other justices (Barrett and Kavanaugh) strongly
indicated that they would be inclined to do so. But although the point had not been
argued, the Chief Justice’s majority opinion seized on language in the city’s foster care
contract which the Chief managed to construe (contrary to the city’s own interpretation)
to mean that the city had discretion to grant exceptions to its nondiscrimination
requirements. This authority to grant exceptions meant that the city’s policy was not
generally applicable, or so the majority maintained.

On this reading, it turned out (contrary to what everyone had supposed) that the Smith
doctrine did not apply to the case anyway, and there was thus no need to consider
overruling that doctrine. The liberal justices joined in that tenuously-maintained
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position, it would seem, in order to avoid the more drastic result of a return to pre-Smith
accommodation.

The bottom line is that, as with the much discussed Masterpiece Cakeshop decision of
2018 (the Colorado baker case), the court seized upon a case-specific fact that hardly
anyone had even noticed, as a way of kicking the can down the road.
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